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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of notification is all that the situation permits.".27 The primary
justification for upholding such "futile" service comes from an
examination of the defendant's duties following an accident, and
from an examination of the feasible methods for locating the
defendant that are left open to the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals felt that anyone involved in a serious
automobile accident is aware that he may be involved in a suit.
He, therefore, as a potential defendant, has a duty to keep his
whereabouts known by contacting either the other parties involved,
his insurance company, or the post office. In concluding, the
Court also pointed out how the interplay of CPLR 317 with CPLR
308 may prevent any harsh results by allowing a defendant, who
was not personally served, and who did not appear, to be relieved
of a default judgment within the proper time and under the proper
circumstances.
CPLR 308(4): Designee faced with procedural dilemma.
In Cosby v. Moyant,28 the defendants' attorney was designated
to receive process on defendants' behalf, pursuant to court order
under CPLR 308(4) .2 9 The attorney attempted to make a special
appearance to object to the designation on the grounds that he
was not representing the defendants in the matter in issue.
The Court held, however, that since the enactment of CPLR
320(b) the procedure of making a special appearance to contest
jurisdiction has been abandoned 30 and that such challenges can
now be asserted only by motion or in a responsive pleading.
It is submitted that, where the court has deemed it appropriate
to serve a summons through a designee, that individual should have
a simple procedure to challenge whether or not he is in fact a
proper designee. There is at present no procedure set forth in the
CPLR for such a challenge and the designee is thus faced with a
dilemma. He might be left in a position of potential liability to
the defendant for not redelivering the service, yet, he might be
totally unaware of who the defendant is or how to locate him.
Furthermore, if the designee must appear either by motion or by
a responsive pleading of the defendant, it must be assumed that
the party served is not only the proper designee for service but
that he has authority to appear for the defendant. This authority
27 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317
(1950).
28 55 Misc. 2d 393i 285 N.Y.S2d 980 (Sup. Ct, N.Y. County 1967).
29Service has been allowed upon someone other than the defendant when
it is shown that his relationship to the defendant is such that it is reason-
ably probable that the defendant will become aware of the action. See
7B McKixNEY's CPLR 308(4), supp. commentary 132 (1966).
30See 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 320, commentary 577-78 (1963).
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the court cannot confer; only the defendant can authorize another
to appear in his behalf.
CPLR 316: Mailing requirement interpreted.
In Gross v. Gross,31 a divorce action, plaintiff-wife sought sup-
port and maintenance. Unable to effectuate personal service, she
was granted an order to serve defendant by publication pursuant
to the procedures of CPLR 316. The court first concluded that it
was proper to assert in personam jurisdiction over the defendant
as a resident of New York since the parties were married here
and made their residence here. Although the defendant could not
be found, no evidence was submitted that he was a non-resident
and thus, a presumption of his residence continued.32  The court
then met a challenge that due process had not been fulfilled by
substituted service, concluding that publication afforded defendant
reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.33
This case may provide one of the few interpretations of 316's
mailing requirement. Under 316, where service is by publication
in a matrimonial action, a copy of the summons must be mailed
to the defendant. The standard by which such a mailing's effec-
tiveness is to be judged can possibly be gleaned from the provision
under which such mailing may be dispensed with by the court.
The section states that such mailing must be made "unless a place
where such person probably would receive mail cannot with due
diligence be ascertained." 34 This would seem to suggest that such
mailing as establishes a probability that it will reach the defendant
is sufficient. Here, the mailing of the summons to the husband in
care of his father was held to be satisfactory.
N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7(c): Court of Appeals clarifies breadth
of suprene court's jurisdiction.
As a court of general original jurisdiction, the supreme court,
in the past, has been held to have subject matter jurisdiction over
all common-law actions 35 and all statutorily-established actions un-
less the Legislature in creating the latter specifically negatives this
result.3 6 The 1962 amendment to section 7 of the judiciary article
of the New York Constitution has prompted recent review of the
3156 Misc. 2d 286, 288 N.Y.S2d 674 (Sup. Ct King's County 1968).
Harris v. Harris, 83 App. Div. 123, 82 N.Y.S. 568 (2d Dep't 1903).
-33McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Rawstorne v. Maguire, 265
N.Y. 204, 192 N.E. 294 (1934).
34CPLR 316(b) (emphasis added).
35 In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 255-58, 53 N.E. 1103, 1104-05 (1899).38Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166, 225
N.E.2d 503, 506, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 798 (1967).
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